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Abstract 
 
During the design stage of the development of a new system, automated fault 
tree construction would produce results a lot sooner than the manual process 
and hence be highly beneficial in order to modify the system design based on 
identified weakest areas. Although much work has been performed in this 
area, the construction of fault trees is still generally done manually. In this 
paper, a new methodology of constructing fault trees from a system 
description is proposed. Multi-state input/output tables are introduced, which 
have the capability to capture output deviations during the normal operation of 
a component as well as under the influence of abnormality or failure. Two 
libraries, namely a component library and a mark library, are introduced. The 
former stores component models and the latter stores a range of marks. The 
main purpose of a mark is to identify a certain feature of the system, such as a 
feedback loop or multiple redundancies. These two libraries are used to 
redraw the system in a graphical environment where the designer can witness 
the system come together and also input the necessary failure data for each 
component. An algorithm has been developed, that uses input/output tables 
and marks, to automatically construct fault trees for failure modes of interest. 
 
In order to demonstrate this methodology, it is applied to an automotive 
emission control system, and a fault tree is generated using the algorithm 
developed in this work. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
With increase in complexity of engineering systems day by day, the necessity 
to identify hazards and control them in time is ever increasing. In today’s world, 
it is a must for any new system to be thoroughly analysed for potential 
hazards, preferably in the early design stages before progressing in the 
product life cycle. Currently, this is not dealt with in the most efficient manner. 
During the system design phase, once an initial system design is completed, it 
is handed over to the Risk and Reliability Department who then manually 
analyse the system and generate an appropriate reliability model. Often, 
within the time they get back to the design team with proposed design 
improvements, the system design has already progressed a long way. At this 
point, the design team either make the changes which prove expensive, or 
carry on with the existing design. In the latter case, the risk of a hazardous 
failure during operation increases and so does the probability of uncertain 
failures. It is this gap which demands an automated reliability model generator 
to avoid the time lapse between the design team and the risk and reliability 
team. In this paper, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been selected as the 
appropriate reliability model 
 
FTA has been identified as one of the most commonly employed reliability 
models in the aeronautical and automotive industry. FTA is a deductive 
approach to determine the various combinations of hardware failures, 
software failures and human errors that could lead to undesirable events at a 
system level. A certain system failure is selected as the top event for which a 
fault tree is generated. This tree combines basic failures with the help of logic 
gates in order to present all possible combinations that could lead to the top 
event. [1]  
 
The construction of fault trees can be time consuming and tedious depending 
on the complexity of the system. As the task is done manually, it is also prone 
to errors and misinterpretations. There have been several attempts in the past 
to explore the requirement of automatic fault tree generation. The most 
ground breaking of methodologies are considered to be the digraph technique 
[2] and the decision table method [3]. The digraph technique uses deviations to 
model failures which allow more freedom to describe different types of failures. 
The decision tables can take into account a larger number of failure modes 
with clarity due to its tabular format.  
 
Besides these, commercial software has been developed to help automate 
the construction process. For example, a program called HiP-HOPS was 
developed by University of Hull and launched in 2012 [4]. This software has 
been integrated with Mathworks Matlab and SimulationX in order to be able to 
extract information from the system model directly. Hip-HOPs requires the 
user to specify failure modes for each component as well as failure 
expressions which link the failure modes and inputs to their respective outputs. 
This requirement gives the user flexibility to define the behaviour of system 
components but at the same time can be time consuming for the user. This 
program definitely aids the user to build a fault tree but it is believed that the 
automation can be done to a greater extent by using predefined generic 
component tables and mark operators which will be explained in Section 4. 
 
The very first requirement of automatic fault tree generation is defining the 
system in a way that bridges the semantic gap. Various approaches have 
been considered for this stage such as system description in the form of 
Computer-Aided Design (CAD), Process and Instrumentation Diagrams 
(P&ID), Mathworks Simulink or even a personalised Graphic User Interface 
(GUI). Lately, System Modelling Language (SysML) has gained a lot of 
importance as it has a vast number of features to describe the system, by 
taking into account system structure as well as behaviour. In this paper, such 
specifics of system description haven’t been discussed, but are being 
explored for future work in this field. 
 
 
 
2. Overview of Methodology 
 
 
Figure 1 - Overview of methodology 
The methodology is explained with the help of a flow diagram as can be seen 
in Figure 1. Each block has been numbered and is expanded as follows:- 
 
(1) System Connectivity: List of system components, inputs and outputs for 
each component. 
 
(2) Component and Mark Library: The component library stores a multi-
state Input / Output (I/O) table for each component. The mark library 
stores a range of marks to identify complex features in a system such 
as loops or redundancies. 
 
(3) Deviation Tree (DevTree): It is an intermediate representation of the 
system which can be used to generate fault trees automatically for any 
given top event. 
 
(4) Top Event Specification: Critical system level failures for which a fault 
tree needs to be generated can be specified here. The format in which 
the top event is specified can be in two different ways:- 
 
a. Specification by means of deviation in an output from a 
component 
b. Specification by means of a partial fault tree 
 
In a system, the top event could either be failure of a certain component, 
abnormality at a certain point in the system or a combination of component 
failures. It is for this reason; the logic code must be able to accept the top 
event in different formats. 
 
(5) Logic Code – AutoFTConst: The algorithm for automatic fault tree 
construction will be written in C++ or Java. It will include predefined 
rules to formulate logic gates, extract component tables and deal with 
marks. These predefined rules are expanded upon in Sections 4 and 5. 
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3. Example System Description 
 
In order to demonstrate the new methodology, it is applied to an automotive 
emission control system. This system is adapted from the lambda closed loop 
control system and the changes made are explained in this section. 
 
The original system can be seen in Figure 2, it comprises of 6 components 
which have been labelled [5]. The composition of mixture of fuel and air 
supplied to the engine is continuously maintained within the optimum 
deviation range by a closed loop control. Hence, the emissions must be 
measured for unburnt oxygen content, and the injected fuel quantity is 
immediately corrected based on this measurement. This measurement is sent 
from the emission flow sensor located in the exhaust pipe, to the controller [6]. 
The air flow sensor also continuously sends mass flow data to the controller. 
Both these measurements are sent in voltages and the controller in turn sends 
a voltage signal to the injection valve to correct its timing accordingly. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Original Emission Control System [5] 
Changes were made to the original system based on the following criteria: 
Requirement of a simple system with limited number of components, a 
negative feedback loop and a redundancy feature in order to demonstrate the 
concept of marks. 
 
Paying attention to the above stated criteria, the following changes were made 
to the original system:- 
 
1. Removal of the catalytic convertor as it is not part of the closed loop 
control. 
2. Treating the injection valves as a single entity. 
3. Addition of the pressure regulator which regulates fuel flow from two 
fuel pumps and supplies it to the injection valve. 
  
 
Figure 3 - Adapted Emission Control System 
3.1 Description of Variables – Mass flow, Voltage 
 
The adapted system is drawn in the form of a block diagram and can be seen 
in Figure 3. Each variable is explained as follows:- 
 
Mass Flow Rates:- 
Fa: Intake Air 
FfP1: Fuel from Pump 1 
FfP2: Fuel from Pump 2 
Ff: Regulated Fuel 
FfT: Fuel - timed injection 
Fdo: Emission flow; Subscript ‘do’ represents Density of unburnt Oxygen 
 
Voltages:- 
Va: Voltage sent by AFS to C, notifying mass flow rate of intake air 
Ve: Voltage sent by EFS to C, notifying amount of unburnt oxygen in the 
emission 
Vc: Voltage sent by C to IV in order to time fuel injection into the engine 
 
3.2 System Boundaries 
 
1. Source of fuel is shown to come from two fuel pumps, each connected 
to a fuel tank. The fuel tanks and pumps are not part of the system as 
these components have been assumed to be failure-proof. 
2. Power sources for the valves, sensors and the controller are not part of 
the system and this marks another boundary of the system under study. 
3. Ordinarily, in an automotive engine, the intake air flow passes through 
an air filter before it goes through the air flow sensor and to the engine. 
In this system however, this component has been disregarded and is 
therefore considered failure-proof as well. 
4. Application of Methodology to Example System 
 
This section illustrates the procedure of systematic fault tree generation by 
applying it to the emission control system. The very first step is generating 
multi state I/O tables for each component in the system. Such tables can be 
generated for a variety of components that appear in aeronautical and 
automotive systems in order to enable reusability and reduce user effort 
during systematic fault tree construction. 
 
4.1 Component Library 
 
The component library stores multi-state I/O tables for each component. 
There are 6 components in the emission control system, hence 6 tables. The 
structure of this table is quite different to the traditional decision table structure 
[3]. These tables use deviations to represent failure modes which provide a 
higher degree of flexibility to represent the type of failure accurately. The 
tables are self-explanatory except for a few notations that are explained 
below:- 
 
Variable Relationship: This states the relationship between the input and 
output in terms of direction of flow. ‘S’ implies single directional flow and ‘B’ 
implies bi-directional flow. 
Deviation: Any variable in a system can deviate from its original state due to 
abnormality or failure. A deviation of ±10 implies uncontrollable disturbance 
and a deviation of ±1 implies controllable disturbance. ‘w’ implies whole range 
of deviation. 
Transmit Coefficient: The relationship between the input and output based on 
proportionality. ‘1’ implies direct proportionality and ‘-1’ implies inverse 
proportionality. A transmit coefficient of ‘0’ implies that the failure is 
independent of the input. 
 
Tables 1 to 6 represent the I/O tables for all the components in the emission 
control system and can be seen as follows:- 
 
 
State No. Variable Relationship Output 
Transmit 
Coefficient Input 
Normal 
  
1 S Va(w) 1 Fa(w) 
2 S Fa(w) 1 Fa(w) 
Failure Modes 
Measurement 
Error 1   Va(w)     
Sensor 
Broken 2  Va(w) 0  
 
Table 1 - Air Flow Sensor (AFS) 
 
State No. Variable Relationship Output 
Transmit 
Coefficient Input 
Normal 
 
1 S Ve(w) 1 Fdo(w) 
2 S Fdo(w) 1 Fdo(w) 
Failure Modes 
Measurement 
Error 1   Ve(w)     
Sensor 
Broken 2   Ve(w) 0   
Table 2 - Emission Flow Sensor (EFS) 
State No. Variable Relationship Output 
Transmit 
Coefficient Input 
Normal 
1 S Vc(w) 1 Va(w) 
2 S Vc(w) 1 Ve(w) 
Failure Modes 
Controller 
failure 1 1   Vc(w)     
Controller 
failure 2 2   Vc(w) 0   
Table 3 - Controller ( C ) 
State No. Variable Relationship Output 
Transmit 
Coefficient Input 
Normal 
1 S Ff(w) 1 Ffp1(w) 
2 S Ff(w) 1 Ffp2(w) 
Failure Modes 
PR valve 
failed 
open 
1   Ff(-10)     
PR valve 
failed 
closed 
2   Ff(+10)     
PR valve 
stuck 3   Ff(w) 0   
Table 4 - Pressure Regulator (PR) 
State No. Variable Relationship Output 
Transmit 
Coefficient Input 
Normal 
1 S Ff T(w) 1 Vc(w) 
2 S Ff T(w) 1 Ff(w) 
Failure Modes 
Timing 
Problem 1   Ff T(w)     
IV broken 2   Ff T(w) 0   
Table 5 - Injection Valve (IV) 
State No. Variable Relationship Output 
Transmit 
Coefficient Input 
Normal 
1 S Fdo(w) 1 Fa(w) 
2 S Fdo(w) -1 Ff T(w) 
Failure Modes 
Engine 
failure 1 1   Fdo(+10)     
Engine 
failure 2 2   Fdo(-10)     
Engine 
failure 3 3   Fdo(w)     
Table 6 - Engine ( E ) 
 
In Table 3, ‘Controller failure 1’ refers to an error in the voltage sent to the 
injection valve. ‘Controller failure 2’ indicates that there is either no voltage 
sent or the voltage sent is independent of its inputs and hence such a failure 
cannot be compensated for by the loop. 
 
4.2 Mark Library 
 
The mark library is a new concept introduced in this paper. While tracing a 
fault through a system automatically, it is difficult to model the trace algorithm 
around complex features such as loops or redundancy. The logic in most 
cases becomes erratic. The mark library is introduced in order to deploy rules 
in the form of operators when such features are encountered in the system. 
For this system, two marks, namely Negative Feed-Back Loop Mark (NFBL 
Mark) and Redundancy Mark (RMark) are introduced. 
 
NFBL Mark: During automatic fault tree generation, when an event is found to 
be part of the NFBL, the fault tree takes the form of the mini-fault tree shown 
in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 - NFBL Operator 
The NFBL operator implies that the top event occurs either if the loop itself 
has failed or if the fault propagates from another component. The event ‘NFBL 
Failed’ implies that the loop itself has failed and is thereby unable to 
compensate any moderate disturbances. The event ‘NFBL Blocked’ will 
combine under an OR gate, failure modes of components in the NFBL that are 
not affected by the input. All these failure modes have a transmit coefficient of 
0 in the I/O tables which implies that their failure is independent of the input 
and hence cannot be compensated by the loop. Event ‘Original Propagation 
Branch’ traces the fault to connecting components. If any of these input 
events are part of the NFBL too, the same operator is deployed again, if not, 
they are dealt with the help of an algorithm which is explained in Section 5. 
RMark: The redundancy mark is deployed in case of multiple redundancies. In 
such a scenario, a failure occurs only if the necessary input has failed as well 
as all the redundancies. Hence the inputs are combined under an AND gate 
as can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Redundancy Mark Operator 
 
4.3 Deviation Tree  
 
Deviation Tree is an intermediate structure which portrays the principal 
diagram along with its inputs, outputs and the transmit coefficient between 
them. This structure can be automatically generated and is used along with 
component tables and mark operators to generate a fault tree for any given 
top event in a systematic manner. 
 
The deviation tree is similar to the topology graph generated by Andrews and 
Henry [7]. In their paper, a topology graph was generated as an intermediate 
representation to aid with identification of loops. 
 
The method of identifying the NFBL loop from the deviation tree is by following 
the path beginning and ending at the very same event. For the example 
system, this path would be E-IV-C-EFS-E as can be seen in Figure 6. The 
deviation tree terminates when event E-Fdo (w) is encountered for the second 
time.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Deviation Tree 
 
Besides the marks introduced in this paper, there is much scope to model 
operators for other complex features, for example, ‘Negative Feed Forward 
Loop’ or ‘Vote Redundancy’. 
 
5. Fault Tree Generation  
 
In this section a fault tree is generated in a systematic manner following the 
methodology described in the previous sections. 
 
The top event selected is an output deviation of Fdo (-1) from the Engine. As 
explained previously, Fdo is the mass flow rate of emissions and a deviation of 
-1 implies that the density of unburnt oxygen is lower than the desired air-fuel 
ratio thereby indicating a rich mixture and in turn black smoke out of the 
exhaust. The reason for selection of this top event is the environmental impact 
of the deviation. 
The algorithm searches the deviation tree for the component associated with 
the top event and this becomes the starting point to trace the fault through the 
system. While generating the fault tree, each event is checked if it belongs to 
any of the marks. If it is, the appropriate operators are deployed, if not, the 
algorithm follows the rules stated below:- 
1. Check I/O tables under ‘Failure Modes’ if deviation can be caused by 
any of them. All such failures are combined under an OR gate. 
2. Check I/O tables ‘Normal State’ to track fault through component inputs 
and transmit coefficient. If more than one input is found, combine 
events under OR gate. 
Figure 7 shows the fault tree generated for top event Fdo (-1). The events are 
named in the following way – ‘Component acronym’ followed by a number 
which represents the failure mode in the I/O tables. For example event ‘E-3’ 
denotes ‘Engine failure 3’. In the example system, 4 out of 6 components are 
part of the NFBL which explains the repeated occurrence of event ‘NFBL 
Failed’ in the fault tree. It is also essential to make the above algorithm work 
seamlessly with the marks while deploying logic gates and events. Figure 4 
shows the NFBL operator which has a block ‘Event not part of NFBL’. This 
allows events outside the NFBL to be developed at the same time, for 
example, event ‘Fa (-1)’ or ‘PR-Ff (+1)’. The deployment of the NFBL events 
has been explained in Section 4.2. The fault tree generated can be further 
trimmed down by deleting repeated events and inconsistent events i.e. events 
that have already occurred higher up in the fault tree by using techniques 
introduced in the past. [8] 
 
 
Figure 7 - Fault Tree for Top Event 'Black Smoke out of Exhaust' 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The concern of assisted fault tree construction during the design stage has 
been undergoing research since the 1970s and has gone a long way since 
then. Component and mark libraries can prove useful in reducing human effort 
and retaining human supervision at the same time. A component library can 
significantly assist systematic fault tree generation by providing the user with 
predefined component tables that represent the behaviour of components 
under failure or abnormality. A mark library can reduce the semantic gap in 
representing complex systems by taking into account the effect of loops or 
redundancies while generating the fault tree. In this paper, only 6 component 
tables and 2 marks were employed, but it provides a platform for expansion. 
 
Component and Mark libraries can be designed in a way that they can simply 
be dragged and dropped onto the system diagram. Having linked the 
component tables and mark operators to the concerned components, they can 
either be used in their original form or be edited to suit the requirements of 
specific components that are not found in the library. This ensures human 
supervision and at the same time avoids repeatability in terms of defining 
failure modes for each component.  
 
A generic component library can be developed for each discipline which 
stores component tables for discipline specific components. This methodology 
is still being developed to accommodate systems from different disciplines of 
engineering. Editing and pruning procedures are also being developed so that 
the tree can be reduced to a concise form by eliminating repeated and 
contradictory events. Human supervision with minimal effort would be the 
ideal degree of automation for a technique as sensitive as fault tree 
generation. 
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